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Article

“Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S.
Workplace Representation
Samuel Estreicher

†

This paper proposes an amendment to our basic labor laws
that I call “easy in, easy out.” Essentially, representation elections—secret-ballot votes to decide whether employees want
union representation and whether they want to be represented
by the particular petitioning labor organization(s)—in relatively broad units, would, over time, become automatic. Every two
years (unless the union achieved a collective bargaining agreement, in which case every three years) the employees in the
unit, after an initial minimal required showing of interest,
would have an opportunity to vote in a secret ballot whether
they wish to continue the union’s representation, select another
organization, or have no union representation at all. Petitioning labor organizations and employers would be required to
share certain specified information, in electronic form, with the
voting employees. The theory is to make representation elections more like general political elections, to make it easier to
vote in a union (if that is the employees’ preference), and to
make it easier to vote the union out if the employees no longer
believe the bargaining agent is accountable to them or worth
the dues they pay. Other aspects of the labor laws would continue unchanged.
† Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director, Center for Labor
and Employment Law, New York University. Text of remarks at the Minnesota Law Review Symposium on the Future of Organized Labor, Oct. 25, 2013,
Minneapolis, Minn. Some of the ideas for this Article originated in Samuel
Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247 (2000), reprinted in 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, and in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE
SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (James T. Bennett & Bruce E.
Kaufman eds., 2002). I thank John T. Addison, John Colwell, Cynthia Estlund,
Laurence Gold, Michael C. Harper, Barry Hirsch, Wilma Liebman, James
Paulsen, Kye D. Pawlenko, Paul Secunda, Lee Seham, and Lafe Solomon for
their careful read and helpful comments. All remaining errors are the author’s. Copyright © 2014 by Samuel Estreicher. All rights are reserved.
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This proposal may be regarded by some as a quixotic enterprise. In many respects, labor law reform may be closer to
the third rail of American politics than even social security (or
healthcare) reform. My colleague Cynthia Estlund has famous1
ly complained of the “ossification” of American labor law, but
at present there is no constituency for change. U.S. managers
and owners are relatively satisfied with the state of U.S. workplace representation, given the low rate (now under eight per2
cent) of unionization in private companies. They might prefer
some alternative to the litigation system for resolution of employment disputes, but do not view union-negotiated grievance
and arbitration systems as preferable to the status quo. Unions, on the other hand, would prefer change but only if it takes
the form of an easier path to obtaining bargaining authority,
coupled with interest arbitration where the parties cannot
agree on a first contract and tort remedies for recalcitrant em3
ployers. If unions cannot get that type of labor law reform,
they prefer to stick with what they have. Employee-side plaintiffs’ lawyers generally thrive under the litigation system; the
change they might seek is repeal of rules enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements covering employment disputes. In
short, there would appear to be no obvious or stable consensus
for labor law reform.
4
This paper is not about politics or political science. It assumes change is not in the offing in the near term. Rather, it
addresses a future-law question: What sort of labor-law regime
would make sense, given U.S. institutional arrangements, our
legal culture, and the likely perspectives of companies (and
their managers), unions, and the employment plaintiffs’ bar?
I. A “PUBLIC INTEREST” CASE FOR EXPANDING
WORKPLACE REPRESENTATION?
Is there a public-interest case for expanding workplace
representation? By “workplace representation,” I mean organi1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
2. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—2013, at 5 tbl.1 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
3. In the proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, S. 560,
111th Cong. (2009), the NLRB would have been authorized to levy civil penalties for repeat NLRA violators.
4. The political considerations are surveyed in Samuel Estreicher, Strategy for Labor Revisited, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 413 (2012).
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zations formed at the workplace with the consent of the affected employees that address workplace concerns through bargaining with employers, whether or not the organizations belong to a larger labor federation, are organized as membership
bodies governed by a constitution, or have the goals of traditional labor unions. By a “public-interest case,” I mean premises that do not depend on one’s political or ideological preferences or on one’s perception of whose political or ideological
oxen will be gored, but rather on a shared sense of what sort of
workplace relations arrangements would help our economy
grow and improve the welfare of all who work for a living. I
think there is such a case.
It has, of course, been the premise of major federal legisla5
tion beginning with the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA), the
6
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, the National Labor Relations
7
Act of 1935 (NLRA), and similar state laws in the Northeast,
8
Midwest, and Pacific Coast states that public policy favors the
right of workers to form organizations of their own choosing, to
engage in strikes and other concerted activity, and to seek to
compel employers to bargain with them in good faith toward
the achievement of collective contracts. The justifications for
these laws are twofold: (1) collective representation helps workers negotiate fairer contracts as a group than they could on
their own and, in the process, boosts consumer demand for U.S.
products and services (the “equality-of-bargaining-power” ra9
tionale); and (2) an administrative process for resolving labor
relations disputes will reduce the incidence of industrial conflict with spillover effects on the larger society (the “industrial10
peace” rationale).

5. Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151–188 (2006)).
6. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101–115 (2012)).
7. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169). Related provisions are also found in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 146 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197). The NLRA and the LMRA are collectively
referred to in the text as the NLRA.
8. See, e.g., Minnesota Labor Relations Act, ch. 440, 1939 Minn. Laws
985 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01–.17 (2013)).
9. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Reestablishing Contact
with Its Original Purpose, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 15 (David Lewin, Bruce E. Kaufman & Donna Sockell eds., 1996).
10. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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Both justifications, in somewhat modified form, still frame
the debate. The industrial-peace rationale has limited ongoing
reach. It does explain the continued need for special measures
11
in the railroad and airlines industries and in the healthcare
12
industry, as well as the power of the President to intervene in
13
national emergency disputes. It also explains the law’s prohibition of certain weapons of economic conflict, such as the secondary boycott, which Congress feared ensnared neutral employers in disputes not of their making. But this is principally a
reactive justification that loses its force with the declining incidence of industrial strife.
The equality-of-bargaining-power rationale has not lost its
force, as attested by continued public agitation for higher wag14
es. But in what sense does the collective-representation option
protected by the labor laws, in the words of the NLRA, help
“restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and
15
employees”? Within the overall equality-of-bargaining-power
objective, we need to distinguish between (1) what labor law
does to remedy defects in the individual-worker contracting
market (what I will call the “market-failure” concern or dimension) and (2) what it does to enhance through collective bargaining (as opposed to political action) “the purchasing power of
16
wage earners in industry” (what I will call the “increasingemployee-economic-power” concern or dimension).
II. THE INTEGRATIVE, NON-REDISTRIBUTIVE FACE OF
UNION REPRESENTATION
As to the market-failure concern, labor law helps solve a
collective-action problem with individual-worker contracting. A
common law agency—where the worker hires and can fire atwill his own representative—does not normally obtain in the
17
employment context. This is because most employees work
11. See RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006).
12. See LMRA § 213, 29 U.S.C. § 183 (added by Act of July 26, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-360, § 2, 88 Stat. 395, 396).
13. LMRA §§ 208–212, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176–182.
14. See, e.g., Karen McVeigh, Walmart Workers Protest over Minimum
Wage in 15 U.S. Cities, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www
.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/05/walmart-workers-strike-us-thursday.
15. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
16. Id.
17. An important exception is in the entertainment and sports industries
where high-valued talent often negotiate their own individual contracts with
the assistance of talent agents regulated somewhat by unions. On talent agen-
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under circumstances where terms and conditions have to be
generally applicable to all who work in similar jobs for the particular employer. Hence, individual employees usually have no
incentive to hire agents to negotiate individualized terms because those terms would have to be extended, as a practical
18
matter, to others similarly situated. In other words, the costs
of a negotiated improvement in collective terms would typically
exceed the value to the individual employee of obtaining that
improvement. Yet there are circumstances where collective improvements might have been negotiated if there had been some
mechanism by which the collective costs of those improvements
could be addressed and absorbed, in whole or in part, by all of
the benefited employees.
Many of the terms negotiated in collective agreements
have this “collective goods” feature. Consider, for example, a
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration as the
final step in the process. It is certainly possible for highly paid
individual employees to negotiate an arbitration clause for
themselves, especially if they occupy a relatively unique posi19
tion within the firm. But for the overwhelming number of a
firm’s rank-and-file production, clerical, maintenance, technical, marketing, distribution, accounting, professional, and
other non-executive workers, any dispute-resolution mechanism would have to be provided, as a practical matter, to all
workers who are similarly situated. To the employer, the costs
of providing the mechanism (including the costs of training
company representatives and paying for mediators and arbitracies, see generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008), and H.A. Artists &
Associates, Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981). The phenomenon
of individual bargaining over the collective agreement’s minimum terms is
discussed in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
18. This is the premise of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW
§§ 2.05–.06 (Council Draft No. 10, 2013) (covering general enforceability of
unilateral employer policy statements). The author is the chief reporter for
this effort.
19. Sometimes companies and executives choose arbitration as the preferred mechanism for resolving contract disputes. See Randall Thomas, Erin
O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959 (2010). In
the financial services industry, arbitration is required as a condition of registration with the industry’s self-regulatory organizations. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1991). See generally Samuel
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 753 (1990); Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Emergence of Employment Arbitration, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 8 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007).
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tors) appear as a collective cost. Collective bargaining provides
a means for workers to collectively express their preference for
such terms, and for the parties to determine whether the collective benefits outweigh the collective costs of its provision and
what the appropriate cost-sharing rule should be.
Companies in non-union settings try to make this type of
determination through their human resources (HR) department—attempting to anticipate employee preferences and designing pay and benefit packages and working conditions that
20
reflect the preferences of a majority of the employees. Such
unilateral standard-setting by non-union management may
well do a good job in many cases, but across the board there are
areas where the approach does not work optimally from the
employees’ perspectives. This is because employees’ reluctance
to voice their concerns means that the HR department may not
learn of them in time or at all. Moreover, where there is a clash
of interests between management and employees, the HR department represents the employer’s interests.
Let’s return to the example of a grievance procedure. Fear
of supervisor retaliation may deter employees from raising legitimate concerns that management would address satisfactorily if it knew of these concerns. Where the supervisor discourages such reports, whether deliberately or because of his style
of supervision, the supervisor is acting against the interests of
management. In other settings, the supervisor is insisting on a
level of work effort that may be excessive but still serves management interests. Employees wishing to retain their position
and the good favor of their supervisor will be reluctant to press
their concerns. Often, the company would be better off if it had
early notice of these issues; employee problems with management style and the intensity of supervision can adversely affect
morale and productivity, can lead to employee quits, and can
sometimes turn into expensive lawsuits against the company.
In the employee-benefits context, management may wish to
shift from a traditional defined-benefit pension plan to a defined-contribution pension plan. The HR department will try to
gauge employee reaction, but sometimes it is the unit championing the initiative or is otherwise implementing a clear directive from upper management. Even if receptive to employee
concerns, HR may not be able to discern the full extent of em20. See generally SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANUNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY
213–14 (rev. ed. 2004).
AGERS,
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ployee opposition to the shift or to some feature of the new
plan. Were these issues identifiable in advance, mitigating
measures might be available that would still permit the shift to
take place but with less adverse impact on, say, long-service
21
employees.
To offer another example, most companies wish to avoid
the human and economic costs of serious on-the-job injuries,
but managers may be unwilling to permit necessary changes in
work routine or to authorize necessary investments in, say, engineering controls that would improve workplace safety but at
an increase in operating costs. Here, too, employees may be
unwilling to press the point; lower- to mid-level supervision
may not be receptive to, or may affirmatively deter expression
of, their concerns. The company, at the upper levels, might
have taken a different view than local managers but may not
learn of the problem until an accident occurs or the company is
22
audited by the government.
Even where employees have been given statutory rights to
a collective good—say, occupational safety and health—the enforcement of those rights is often lodged with an inevitably under-staffed government agency or remitted to private rights of
action that depend on the availability of private lawyers. Collective bargaining can result in an enforcement mechanism—
both in terms of identifying violations and providing relatively
prompt redress—that is often cheaper and more effective than
23
either government action or litigation.
These and other examples suggest that a case can be made
for some form of independent worker voice to help press employee interests in settings where local supervision/manage21. Problems of this sort occurred in connection with IBM’s attempt to
move from a traditional defined-benefit pension plan to a “cash balance” plan,
also a defined-benefit plan but one which tends to favor long-term workers less
than the traditional plan. See generally The Official National Site for the IBM
Employees’ Union CWA Local 1701, AFL-CIO, ALLIANCE@IBM, http://www
.endicottalliance.org (last updated Apr. 2, 2014). The Seventh Circuit upheld
IBM’s conversion to a cash balance plan against a challenge under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633(a) (2012), in
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006).
22. See David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30
INDUS. REL. 20 (1991).
23. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law
Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 827 (1996); Stewart J. Schwab, The Union as Broker of Employment
Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 248 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012).
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ment may be opposed but the employee demands are not inconsistent with the overall interests of the firm. This is essentially
the integrative, non-redistributive case for workplace represen24
tation. By the term “integrative,” I am suggesting a workerorganization role that does not detract from the company’s return on investment and that helps achieve worker objectives
25
without materially increasing operating costs to the company.
III. THE ADVERSARIAL, REDISTRIBUTIVE FACE OF
UNION REPRESENTATION
The increasing-employee-economic-power objective of the
labor laws, by contrast, envisions not merely an improvement
in the contracting process—in the ability of the firm to achieve
its goals—but also a strengthening of labor’s leverage in bargaining with the employer. Whether the economic surplus produced by the firm expands or not, this objective seeks a larger
share of the surplus for the employees. Improved bargaining
outcomes are said to result from the expertise of union negotiators, the building up of union strike funds to enable workers to
hold out for desired terms for longer periods of time than they
could on their own, and, in some cases, the ability of the union,
in alliance with other organizations, to impose increased labor
costs (derived from the union’s economic gains) on all competitors in the same product market. This is the redistributive case
for workplace representation—that workers can obtain a larger
part of the economic returns from the firm’s operations than
workers could without collective representation.
Most workers who vote for, and are willing to pay dues to,
unions expect union representation to bring higher wages, richer benefits, and better working conditions. Effecting such out24. Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 81, 85 (2009).
25. This terminology originated in a description of models (or styles) of
collective bargaining in RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1965). I
first used it in describing models of unionism in Samuel Estreicher, Models of
Workplace Representation for an Era of Global Labor and Product Market
Competition, in LABOUR LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: LIBER
AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF RUTH BEN-ISRAEL 51 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2001),
and further developed the concept in Estreicher, supra note 24, at 85. The
basic dichotomy between “integrative” and “redistributive” workplace representation is inspired by the distinction between the “voice” and “monopoly”
face(s) of unions in RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 6–7 (1984).
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comes is also how union leaders see their primary objective.
And there are situations (usually where firms face limited
product market competition) where unions are able to obtain
such improvements from the employer without harming the
26
employer’s position in the market or financial health. Where
this occurs, the unions help boost the purchasing power of represented workers, with some positive spillover effects for nonunion employees of companies who anticipate being targeted
for union organizing down the road and attempt to ward off
such efforts by adopting the economic or other terms of union27
ized employers. Collective bargaining here can help reduce
28
the extra-competitive returns monopoly firms enjoy. This is
what my colleague Richard Epstein (no fan of unionism or col29
lective bargaining) calls a “bilateral monopoly,” and suggests
a limited public-interest case for a redistributive model of
30
workplace representation.
It is not always clear, however, whether unions can achieve
these objectives and, if they can, whether these gains come out
of the employer’s profits or are ultimately paid for by other
31
means. Many economists would say that if unions take away
from firm profits, they undermine the firm’s economic perfor32
mance and its prospects for growth. In this account, signifi26. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise
of Voluntarism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 415, 419 (2010).
27. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 152–53.
28. See infra note 32.
29. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1385 (1983).
30. See Richard Freeman’s interesting essay on labor’s new role in the
face of financialization of U.S. industry. Richard Freeman, New Roles for Unions and Collective Bargaining Post the Implosion of Wall Street Capitalism, in
THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NEGOTIATING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 254 (Susan Hayter ed., 2011).
31. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 419 (1992), for a valiant effort to defend redistributive unionism.
32. Unions affect investment and the growth of the firm. See WHAT DO
UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 16–20 (James T. Bennett & Bruce
E. Kaufman eds., 2007). Their effect on profits is ambiguous; studies find a
limited effect in competitive industries and a much more significant effect in
concentrated industries (where profits might be considered “monopoly rents”
and presumably it would be easier to pass on the costs of the labor contract to
the consumer). See generally John T. Addison & Clive R. Belfield, Unions and
Employment Growth: The One Constant? 11–12 (Inst. for the Study of Labor,
Discussion Paper No. 479, 2002), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp479.pdf (discussing unions’ adverse effects on employment growth and profitability). Unions do not, however, drive companies out of business. See Richard B. Freeman
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cant union wage gains of this sort will tend to be short-lived,
unless the company has physical assets in place it cannot easily
33
move or dispose of. Otherwise, the firm will either move to a
less union-friendly region or reduce its investment level in the
unionized part of its business. More likely, any union wage
gains will come at the expense of the employment level at the
unionized business, as the company substitutes capital for labor and lower-priced subcontractors for its own people. In
short, we are told, higher union-negotiated wages invariably
means fewer available jobs at those wages.
Whatever one’s view of the net benefits of the redistributive role of unions for the employees involved or the larger society, they are harder to come by in today’s world. In large part
because of the effects of technology, deregulation, and global
product and labor market competition, unions increasingly face
difficulty compelling competitors of unionized firms to operate
34
on the same terms. If the unionized firm cannot be insulated
from competition on the basis of labor costs, that firm will not
for long continue to bear the costs of the union-negotiated wage
and benefit package. Again, the firm has a number of options—
it can substitute capital for labor, leave the region, deprive its
unionized plant of needed capital investment, transfer assets to
purchasers who will operate on a non-union basis, take a strike
to force a lower-cost contract, or go into bankruptcy.
The question for people who care about workplace representation is whether the social benefits of employee organization can be preserved without inviting, or fostering, aspects of
redistributive trade unionism that can create a downward spiral for unionized companies.
IV. THE EUROPEAN TWO-CHANNEL APPROACH TO
WORKER REPRESENTATION
Continental European countries offer a potential alternative approach. These countries typically provide a dual track of
representation: (1) works councils that operate at the firm level
& Morris M. Kleiner, Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?, 52 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 510, 526 (1999).
33. See, e.g., Barry T. Hirsch, Unions, Dynamism, and Economic Performance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 23, at 107, 131–32.
34. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive
Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12–15 (1993); Estreicher, supra note
24, at 82–91.
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as a consultative organ without the right to strike or negotiate
35
wages; and (2) trade unions that operate at the multiemployer level to negotiate wages and other economic terms for
broad sectors of industry. Employers are under no legal duty to
bargain with unions, but extension laws enable labor ministries
to impose collective bargaining contracts on unorganized sec36
tors of industry. Unions play an informal role in the works
councils; their representatives often secure elected work counci37
lor positions. But works councils have their own legal status
with statutory rights to information and to be consulted over
important firm decisions, such as layoffs and the introduction
38
of new technology.
Collective bargaining occurs at the multi-enterprise level
with employers organized into large multi-employer federations
negotiating a minimum-terms agreement with the national, regional, or sectoral federation of unions. Because many companies of different size and economic position are represented
through the employer federations, and firm participation, in
the first instance, is voluntary (although subject to the prospect
39
of extension decrees), the collective agreement must be keyed
to the economic situation of the median or maybe even to the
economically weaker members of the employer federation. If a
company wishes to pay wages above the collectively-bargained
minimum, as it may have to in order to retain its workers, this
is done in an informal manner after consultation with the
40
works council. These above-the-collective-contract wages are
typically not legally binding, but subject to unilateral modification by the employer when its position worsens.
35. See generally Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic
Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
36. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER, GLOBAL ISSUES IN LABOR LAW 177–83
(2007); Estreicher, supra note 34, at 15–17 & n.49.
37. See ESTREICHER, supra note 36, at 219 (“It is estimated that about
80% of those sitting on a [German] works council belong to a union.”).
38. See Freeman & Lazear, supra note 35, at 27, 29.
39. See ESTREICHER, supra note 36, at 177, 180–81, 218.
40. See John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick, German
Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 247,
248 (2010); Sven Jung & Claus Schnabel, Paying More Than Necessary? The
Wage Cushion in Germany, 25 LABOUR 182, 183 (2011). The claim that works
councils have positive effects on firm productivity is challenged in John T. Addison et al., German Works Councils in the Production Process 22 (Inst. for the
Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 812, 2003). For an overall positive assessment of works councils, see Freeman & Lazear, supra note 35.
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Many Continental European countries are handicapped by
rigid aspects of their labor systems (although more flexible
rules have been under discussion). Critics of the European approach point to legislation that prohibits discharge without
cause, mandates that buyers of companies retain the prior
workforce and wage and benefit levels, and requires cumbersome negotiation of restructuring plans and payment of severance benefits before layoffs can take place.
Even if aspects of the European model were otherwise desirable, however, no magic wand is available to transplant it to
the United States. Aside from the lack of political will, there is
a fundamental problem of institutional fit because unions in
this country operate as bargaining agents at the company level.
Either the works councils would entirely displace unions, or
41
they would be unions in all but name. The very feature of the
European model that may be most attractive—the separation of
the integrative and redistributive roles of workplace organization—could not be readily accomplished.
We need an American solution that fits American institutional arrangements and legal culture.
V. THE BASIC PROPOSAL: FROM “HARD IN, HARD OUT”
TO “EASY IN, EASY OUT”
The basic proposal here is to convert what is now a “hard
in, hard out” system for deciding whether employees obtain
workplace representation, to an “easy in, easy out” system.
Current arrangements make it very difficult for a union to obtain bargaining authority and therefore very expensive for a
union to organize new workers. Sometimes a union can secure
the employer’s voluntary recognition because the company
42
needs support for a critical regulatory approval, it wishes to
be relieved of the pressures of a union-mounted “corporate
41. Volkswagen is apparently considering a German-style works council
at its Chattanooga, Tennessee plant. Jack Ewing & Bill Vlasic, VW Plan
Opens Door to Union and Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, at B1. In February 2014, the employees at the Chattanooga plant voted against representation by the United Automobile Workers (UAW), even though the company
supported the union bid and the union had indicated receptivity to the workscouncil idea. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Regroups in South After VW Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/business/labor
-regroups-in-south-after-vw-vote.html. The union is challenging the election
results. Id.
42. See, e.g., Harry C. Katz et al., The Revitalization of the CWA: Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 573, 580 (2003).
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43

campaign,” or the parent foreign corporation acquiesces to union representation for its U.S. affiliate in order to stay on good
44
terms with its own domestic unions. Where unions have this
sort of leverage, the company will recognize the union (upon
proof of majority support)—for at least some of its operations—
without a fight.
More typically, a fight ensues. The union files a petition for
a representation election with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). The petition triggers an administrative process
during which an intense, often bitter campaign is mounted by
45
both sides to affect the outcome of the election. Normally, the
election results are also hardly the end of the matter, as at
least two years of litigation awaits the resolution of unfair labor-practice issues resulting from the campaign.
The fight is so intense because the stakes are high. They
are certainly high for the employer who faces the prospect of a
third-party bargaining agent likely—if the union’s record and
its current promises to its employees are a good guide to the future—to seek costly wages and benefit terms and cumbersome
work rules. The union may, of course, temper its bargaining objectives and rhetoric once it is in place, but the employer faces
considerable uncertainty, which it tends to resolve by fighting
46
the organizing drive.
The stakes are also high for the workers involved because
their job security will depend on the continued economic health
of the employer. A good number of the workers may be dissatisfied with their wages or their supervisors—after all, unions do
not try to organize facilities without some worker support, and
need thirty percent of a bargaining unit to obtain an NLRB
election. But once workers hear their employer’s concerns about
the adverse consequences of unionization or the record of the
43. See Estreicher, supra note 26, at 423. See generally JAROL B.
MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS AND
THE ATTACK ON THE CORPORATION (2001).
44. Cf. Anne Tempel et al., Subsidiary Responses to Institutional Duality:
Collective Representation Practices of US Multinationals in Britain and Germany, 59 HUMAN REL. 1543 (2006).
45. See generally Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 495 (1993).
46. This is why the law should allow framework agreements between employers and unions that do not take effect until the union is able to demonstrate majority support in an appropriate unit. See Montague v. NLRB, 698
F.3d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2012); Samuel Estreicher & Andrew M. Kramer, NLRB
Allows Pre-Recognition Framework Agreement, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 2011, at 4.
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particular union, they often will tend to resolve uncertainty by
47
voting “no union.”
The union, too, cannot readily afford to lose. A loss means
that resources invested in the organizing drive have gone to
waste and sends a signal to other employers in the industry,
some of whom may be under union contract, that the union
lacks “muscle,” that it cannot impose its collectively-bargained
terms on the non-union sector. The likely calculus for the union
is to avoid organization and contested elections altogether and
pursue a “corporate campaign” or other means of placing pressure on companies to submit at least part of their operations to
unionization. Moreover, unions increasingly appear to be moving in the direction of becoming more of a political movement
48
than a collective-bargaining agency.
The thesis of this paper is that the stakes can be considerably lowered by making it easier for workers to disavow or
change union representation after they have had a chance to
experience it. Under present rules, the path to union representation is “hard in” (as discussed), but the exit from union representation is also “hard out.” Whether the union obtains its bargaining authority informally (by the employer’s voluntary
recognition or simply the operation of the contract over time) or
formally (through NLRB certification after a representation
49
election), decertification requires an election. Moreover, a petition requires a thirty-percent showing of interest among the
workers and cannot be filed during the “insulated period”—
usually a year from certification (with the period of unfair labor
practices tacked on)—that the union is given by law to demon-

47. I agree with the views of commentators that employer opposition to
the union drives down employee support for the union. See, e.g., Benjamin I.
Sachs, Union Organizing and the Architecture of Employee Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 23, at 146, 157–59. I question, however, whether that effect is due to
unlawful opposition, rather than simply the fact of employer opposition. I also
question the premise that employer opposition does not provide useful information to the employees considering whether to unionize or not.
48. This move is openly endorsed in Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled
Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013).
49. Interestingly, “hard out” is also a feature of the Canadian “easy in”
system. See Micah Berul, Revitalizing American Labor Through CanadianStyle Certification Reform: Is It in the Cards?, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND
THE AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE: AS WE ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY
939, 977–78 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 2000).

2014]

1629

EASY IN, EASY OUT
50

strate its effectiveness as a bargaining agent. If a contract is
in place, workers dissatisfied with the union, again with the
requisite thirty-percent showing of interest, must time their petition during a narrow window no earlier than ninety days before nor later than sixty days before the expiration of the con51
tract. If a renewal contract is entered into with a term of three
years of more, the NLRB will not recognize a decertification petition for another three years except for the ninety-to-sixty day
52
window period from expiration of the new agreement.
Under present law, employers may not give any assistance
53
to the decertification effort. Even so much as telling employees their rights to file such a petition and allowing them time
off from work or giving them carfare to go to the NLRB regional
office to file it will lead to disallowance of the petition or nullifi54
cation of the election results. Employers are not permitted to
poll their workers, even by means of a secret ballot, unless they
already have an objective, good-faith doubt of the union’s ma55
jority. Even if workers no longer pay their dues or go to union
meetings, and a good number come to management on their
own to disavow the union, the NLRB is likely to rule the employer’s withdrawal of recognition to be an unfair labor prac56
tice, and is likely, under current practice, not to hold an election until this and other unfair labor practice charges are
resolved (the agency’s so-called “blocking charge” policy). Add
to all of this the virtual disappearance of rival unionism, and
the prospect of competition among union organization is quite
remote.

50. See NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2012); Kye D. Pawlenko,
Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 653 (2006).
51. See Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962);
Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247, 250
(2000), reprinted in 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501; Pawlenko, supra note 50,
at 653.
52. Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 125 (1962); Pawlenko, supra
note 50, at 653.
53. Estreicher, supra note 51, at 250.
54. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.3d 209, 211–
12, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
55. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361,
280 (1998).
56. See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (ruling
that employers may withdraw recognition from a union only if they can prove
that the union in fact has lost its majority support).
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Additionally, full rights of participation in the union are
limited to union members. Unless represented employees are
willing to become full-fledged union members—which entails
higher dues (which reflect to some extent union political expenditures), union duties like manning a picket line, and the
risk of union discipline for, say, refusing to honor a picket
line—they have no say in the internal governance of the union.
Most especially, they have no say over important economic decisions such as whether to accept the employer’s final offer,
whether to vote for strike authorization, whether to end a losing strike, and whether to ratify the contract negotiated by the
union on their behalf.
Considered on their own terms, these rules make sense,
furthering legitimate interests in giving new bargaining agents
a chance to show their wares, promoting bargaining stability
once contacts are reached, keeping the employer as much out of
the process as possible, and preserving union autonomy by separating out the rights of union members from those of nonmember represented employees. The net effect, however, is to
create a fairly high barrier to exiting a union-representation
regime or even being able to change bargaining representatives. It would be as if our vote for President of the United
States or mayor of a large city were in substance a vote for an
indefinite term, with the only chance of getting a vote to review
the incumbent requiring a showing of support by thirty percent
of the electorate and a limited period of time to file a petition,
and no realistic prospect of competing bids for office.
A. “EASY IN” COMPONENT
The basic proposal has two elements: the first is “easy in”;
the second is “easy out.” Both are necessary. Both borrow from
the experience of our general political elections. Both require a
revision of the representation-election provisions of the basic
labor laws, the NLRA, and the RLA.
The “easy in” component would apply to workers not pres57
ently represented by a labor organization for collective bar57. For purposes of this proposal, I adopt the definition of “labor organization” in section 2(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). Such an organization cannot be employer-supported or -dominated under section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). See generally Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal
of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994). Such an organization
would also be subject to the union democracy and fiduciary safeguards of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), Pub. L.
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gaining purposes. On a limited showing of interest, workers
would have an automatic right, once every two years—say, on
the second Monday after Labor Day—to cast a secret-ballot
vote on whether they wish to be represented by a union and
whether they wish to be represented by one of the petitioning
unions. The NLRB and the National Mediation Board (NMB),
its counterpart under the RLA, would be empowered to promulgate rules establishing in advance, and without the requirement of a hearing, appropriate bargaining units for the election
and at least initial bargaining. The electorate would be all fulland part-time employees on the payroll by, say, Labor Day. The
election would be decided by a majority of the votes cast within
the particular unit. If a majority of the workers in the unit
votes against union representation, the agency could not hold
58
another election for a year. If the majority of the workers in
the unit votes for representation by one of the petitioning unions, that union would be automatically certified as the bargaining agent for a period of two years. The employer would be
under a statutory duty to bargain with the certified union, as it
59
is under present law. A run-off election would be held if no
choice won a majority on the first ballot.
B. “EASY OUT” COMPONENT
The “easy out” component would apply to any bargaining
unit of workers covered by the NLRA or RLA for whom a union
has been certified as the statutory bargaining agent, whether it
achieved a collective bargaining contract or not. The workers in
the unit would be able after two years to vote in an automatic
secret-ballot election to decide whether they wished to continue
the representation of the certified bargaining agent, whether
they wanted no representation at all, or whether they wished to
be represented by another, petitioning union. As with the initial election, a majority vote for no representation would preclude an NLRB election for another year; a vote to continue
representation by the certified agent or to be represented by
another union would preclude an election for a period of two
years.

No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531). I relax
the latter assumption in Estreicher, supra note 51, at 255.
58. This corresponds to the one year “election bar” in section 9(c)(3) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
59. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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C. ADDITIONAL FEATURES
1. Showing of Interest
It may inadvisable, given the number of potential bargaining units across the country, to incur the costs of running an
election without some limited showing of interest on the part of
the affected workers. I have in mind a five-to-ten percent showing in an appropriate unit. Some have suggested retaining a
thirty-percent requirement for the initial representation elec60
tion. Two reasons have been offered: First, unions generally
are going to want to be able to sign up at least thirty percent of
the workers before they petition for an election that requires
they win over a majority in a secret-ballot election. Second, given the number of potential bargaining units, it would be a
waste of scarce administrative resources to require an election
where this level of interest cannot be manifested. Any renewal
election would be automatic after two years, without requiring
a showing of interest.
These arguments have merit but have to be balanced
against the desirability of relatively easy access to representation elections—the “easy in” feature of the basic proposal. Unions as petitioning organizations would generally wait until
they have substantial support before they would call for an
election. The proposal envisions situations where unorganized
workers may seek representation even in advance of any established union organization appearing on the scene.
2. Access
Elections require an informed electorate. The NLRB has
authority under current law to give a union limited access to
employees once the required showing of interest for an election
61
has been demonstrated. Presently, the agency requires only
that the employer provide contact information for unit employ62
ees. This could be extended to requiring union access to nonwork areas like the parking lot, cafeteria, and break room, and

60. Interview with Lafe Solomon, Former Acting Gen. Counsel, NLRB, in
N.Y.C. (Oct. 21, 2013).
61. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National
Labor Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1,
14–15 (2009).
62. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).
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could be conditioned on compliance with reasonable security
63
procedures.
3. Election Units
A significant policy choice for Congress would be whether
to codify the existing bargaining-unit structure adopted by the
NLRB and NMB, or to guide the process by stipulating the unit
structure that would obtain in the absence of affirmative agency action to change the default rule. Broad, inclusive units—
say, one unit of all hourly workers at a given physical location
and one unit of all salaried, non-professional and nonmanagerial workers at that location—would be more likely to
foster an integrative perspective by the union than smaller
units. Broad units would also cut down the number of elections
that need to be conducted. Unions are likely to object because it
is harder for a union to win a large unit and there may be a serious heterogeneity of employee perspectives in such a unit
64
complicating effective collective action.
4. Rival Bids
Where a petition has been filed with, say, a thirty-percent
showing of interest, a rival organization should be able to get
on the ballot by making a five-percent showing of interest. Notice of the initial organization’s bid would be published on the
NLRB or NMB website, and rival organizations would have,
say, up to thirty days to make the required showing. The date
of renewal elections would also be published on the agency’s
website, which rival organizations would be likely to monitor if
interested in making a bid. Rival unions would need to make
the same five-percent showing of interest to get on the renewal
election ballot.
5. Contract Bar
Under present NLRB law, a collective bargaining agreement with a fixed duration of three or more years bars a representation election for three years, save for the ninety-to-sixty
63. See Estreicher, supra note 61, at 15–16.
64. These objections from the union side merit further evaluation. The experience under the RLA and during the early years of the NLRA suggests,
however, that unions can win large units. In any event, the NLRB should not
hold elections in small units that are not viable bases for collective bargaining.
See NLRA § 9(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (specifying that the extent of organization cannot be a determinative factor in unit determination).
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day window period. This bar promotes an important interest in
contract stability. It can be preserved under an “easy in, easy
out” regime by deferring the automatic renewal vote to three
(or possibly four) years, but without requiring any showing of
interest on the part of the affected workers to trigger such a
vote.
6. Mandatory Disclosure
One way to de-escalate the atmosphere of representation
elections is to require disclosure of appropriate information to
enable workers to discount campaign propaganda and make intelligent voting decisions. The NLRB or NMB could be authorized to require petitioning unions to disclose what they would
charge for dues and other fees, whether workers would have a
right to vote on strike authorization and contact ratification
without becoming union members, and whether workers as union members would be subject to union discipline and for what
reasons. Unions might also be required to disclose basic terms
of the collective bargaining agreements they have achieved in
the same industry or location. Employers could be required to
make appropriate disclosure of their economic performance at
the particular business level, say, at the level of the facility and
its business division within the company. If such information,
not usually part of even a public company’s publicly available
annual reports, requires confidential treatment, disclosure
could be limited to accountants or other professional intermediaries who would report back to the union or workers in a
manner that would not entail a breach of confidence. These
rules could be liberalized by contract after a union obtains bargaining authority.
7. Grandfathering
Some grandfathering will be required to avoid disruption
in existing units. One option is to allow existing bargaining relationships to continue indefinitely, subject to existing rules for
decertification and employer withdrawal of recognition. A better approach would be to exempt existing relationships from
the new “easy in, easy out” regime for a substantial fixed period
of, say, five or ten years.
8. Voluntary Recognition
Where there is no existing certified representative, employers should be permitted voluntarily to recognize a union on
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a showing of majority support in one of the agency-designated
appropriate bargaining units. The recognition would have the
same effect as an NLRB certification, and would be subject to
an automatic secret-ballot renewal election after two years (absent a contract of three years’ duration or more).
9. Bargaining Structure
As under current law, the parties would be free to bargain
on a broader basis than the initial election unit. Any continuation of bargaining authority in non-grandfathered units would
be subject to an automatic secret-ballot renewal election in the
same unit where the initial election was held.
10. LMRDA-Compliant Labor Organizations
Another important policy choice for Congress is to decide
whether to limit eligibility for bargaining authority to labor organizations that comply with the democracy and fiduciary safeguards of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
65
66
(LMRDA). As I have written elsewhere, it is not entirely
clear that workers are well-served by effectively limiting the
pool of available bargaining agents to LMRDA-compliant non67
profit membership associations. The recent emergence of socalled “workers’ centers,” principally funded by foundations, is
68
a case in point. There would seem to be no good reason why
single-purpose worker groups interested only in, say, bargaining over healthcare or retirement benefits could not vie for bargaining authority under this proposal. Of course, if they have
no desire to bargain with the employer, they have no need for
bargaining authority under the “easy in, easy out” regime. Organizations that combine collective bargaining with careerbuilding and referral services or professional associations that

65. See LMRDA §§ 501–504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501–504; LMRDA § 505 (amending LMRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186).
66. See Estreicher, supra note 51, at 254–55.
67. Neither the NLRA nor the RLA require compliance with the LMRDA,
but labor organizations may not be functioning lawfully if they fail to comply
with the LMRDA. It is conceivable, in theory, that an individual could be certified as a bargaining agent under section 9 of the NLRA, but this rarely occurs.
68. See generally U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEW MODEL OF REPRESENTATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING WORKER CENTERS (2014), available
at http://www.workforcefreedom.com/sites/default/files/WFI%20Worker%
20Center%20Study%20-%20New%20Model%20of%20Representation.%
20Final%20version%20downloaded%202.20.14.pdf.
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also include supervisors may offer other examples of desirable
options for some workers.
***
The “easy in, easy out” proposal is not a panacea but it
does hold promise for a possible future for U.S. workplace representation.

